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Unspeakably Cruel — Torture, Medical Ethics, and the Law
 
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
 
Torture is a particularly horrible crime, and any par-
ticipation of physicians in torture has always been
difficult to comprehend. As General Telford Taylor
explained to the American judges at the trial of the
Nazi doctors in Nuremberg, Germany (called the
“Doctors’ Trial”), “To kill, to maim, and to torture
is criminal under all modern systems of law . . .
yet these [physician] defendants, all of whom were
fully able to comprehend the nature of their acts





 Taylor told the judges
that it was the obligation of the United States “to all
peoples of the world to show why and how these
things happened,” with the goal of trying to pre-
vent a repetition in the future. The Nazi doctors de-
fended themselves primarily by arguing that they
were engaged in necessary wartime medical re-





 These defenses were rejected because they
are at odds with the Nuremberg Principles, articu-
lated a year earlier, at the conclusion of the multi-
national war crimes trial in 1946, that there are
crimes against humanity (such as torture), that in-
dividuals can be held to be criminally responsible





Almost 60 years later, the question of torture dur-
ing wartime, and the role of physicians in torture,
is again a source of consternation and controversy.
Steven Miles, for example, relying primarily on gov-
ernment documents, has noted that at the prisons
at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
“at the operational level, medical personnel evalu-
ated detainees for interrogation, and monitored
coercive interrogation, allowed interrogator to
use medical records to develop interrogations ap-
proaches, falsified medical records and death cer-




The Red Cross, on the basis of an inspection of
Guantanamo in June 2004, alleged that the physi-
cal and mental coercion of prisoners there is “tan-
tamount to torture” and specifically labeled the
active role of physicians in interrogations as “a fla-




Bloche and Marks have reported, on the basis of
their interviews with some of the physicians in-
volved in interrogations at Guantanamo Bay and
in Iraq, that the physicians believed “that physi-
cians serving in these roles do not act as physicians





 Psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton has suggest-
ed that the reports of U.S. physicians’ involvement
in torture from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantana-
mo echo those of the Nazi doctors who were “the





 Nonetheless, the muting of the
criticism of such torture prompted Elie Wiesel to
ask why the “shameful torture to which Muslim
prisoners were subjected by American soldiers [has





The United States has grown accustomed to set-
ting the standard for the world in condemning tor-
ture as always criminal and always an inexcusable
violation of human rights. It was therefore disturb-
ing to watch the new U.S. attorney general, Alberto
Gonzales, try to defend the administration’s policies
on torture in the wake of the attacks on September
11, 2001, at a Senate panel hearing on his nomina-
tion this past January. The first question Gonzales
was asked by Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) was,





 Two weeks later, the new
secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, pointedly re-
fused to characterize forced nudity and simulated
drowning as techniques of torture, insisting instead
that “the determination of whether interrogation
techniques are consistent with international obliga-





 Until September 11, the United States
had always and unequivocally condemned torture
and those who engage in it, but since U.S. law on
torture appears to be obscure to our highest officials
charged with enforcing it, it is well worth reviewing.
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In 1994, the United States ratified the international
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and
followed that by enacting specific laws against tor-
ture. Even before this, Congress had passed the Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act of 1991. As the Supreme
Court stated in 2004, this act provides “authority
that ‘establishes an unambiguous and modern basis





 The act provides that any person (including
a noncitizen) can bring a civil action in U.S. courts
against any other person who “under actual or ap-
parent authority, or color of law, of any foreign na-
tion” subjects a person to torture or extrajudicial
killing. “Torture” is defined there, as in the Conven-
tion against Torture, as
any act, directed against an individual in the
offender’s custody or physical control, by
which severe pain or suffering . . . whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on that individual for such purposes as ob-
taining from that individual or a third person
information or a confession, punishing that
individual for an act that individual or third
person has committed or is suspected of hav-
ing committed, intimidating or coercing that
individual or a third person or for any reason




Government-sanctioned torture is prohibited in
the United States by the 5th Amendment to the
Constitution (which has a prohibition against self-
incrimination that was adopted specifically to pro-
hibit the use of torture to extract confessions), the
8th Amendment (which prohibits “cruel and un-
usual punishment”), and the 14th Amendment.
Torture is also a crime under state criminal stat-
utes prohibiting assault and battery. An addition-
al federal statute, which also follows the Conven-
tion against Torture, makes it a crime for any person
“outside the United States” to commit or to attempt
to commit torture, which is defined for this pur-
pose as “an act committed by a person acting un-
der the color of law specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering . . .





This antitorture statute has recently been the
subject of conflicting interpretations from the De-
partment of Justice. After September 11, Justice
Department lawyers argued (wrongly) that the pres-
ident, as commander in chief, has the authority to
order the torture of prisoners and that, contrary to
the Nuremberg Principles, obeying such an order
is a valid defense against a charge of a war crime or




 The August 1, 2002,
memorandum from the Justice Department to Al-
berto Gonzales, then legal counsel to the president,
also concluded that to constitute torture under the
statute, the pain inflicted “must be equivalent in in-
tensity to the pain accompanying serious physical
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily




 This memorandum, in
which Justice Department lawyers acted more like
private attorneys advising their clients (in this case,
government officials) on how they might avoid pros-
ecution under the antitorture statute (rather than
advising them to follow the law), has been widely
and rightly criticized. The Department of Justice
withdrew the memorandum shortly after it became




One week before the hearing on the nomination
of Alberto Gonzales to the post of attorney gener-
al, on December 30, 2004, the Justice Department
issued a replacement memorandum that set forth
its new interpretation of the antitorture law, which
is much more consistent with the language of the
law and U.S. policy. This memorandum begins by
expressing the overriding theme of U.S. law on tor-
ture: “Torture is abhorrent both to American law
and values and to international norms. This uni-
versal repudiation of torture is reflected in our
criminal law . . . international agreements . . .
customary international law, centuries of Anglo-
American law, and the longstanding policy of the





This is all to the good. Unfortu-
nately, the memorandum also raises important is-
sues of hypocrisy and secrecy, stating, in footnote
eight, that prior opinions — still secret — approv-
ing various interrogation techniques “for [use with]
detainees” are not affected by the replacement
memorandum. One such opinion, prepared for the
Central Intelligence Agency, is reported to author-
ize the use of 20 interrogation techniques, includ-
ing “waterboarding,” in which a person is made to




President Bush said on June 30, 2003, that “tor-
ture anywhere is an affront to human dignity every-
where,” and on July 5, 2004, that “America stands
against and will not tolerate torture. . . . Torture
is wrong no matter where it occurs, and the United
States will continue to lead the fight to eliminate it
torture
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 The challenge for the administration
— and for all of us — is to match actions to words.
Almost 25 years ago, William Curran devoted his









 He reported on what was then






 Pena-Irala, in which the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York ruled
that U.S. courts, under the Federal Alien Tort Stat-
ute (also referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act),
had jurisdiction to hear civil cases brought against
torturers by noncitizens who were victims of that
torture.17
The case involved a physician who brought suit
in the United States against the inspector general
of police of Asunción, Paraguay, for the torture
and murder of his 17-year-old son. In his opinion
upholding jurisdiction, Judge Irving R. Kaufman
summarized universally accepted principles of in-
ternational human rights law: “The torturer has
become — like the pirate and the slave holder be-
fore him — hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind.”17 Judge Kaufman and his court could
make law only for the Second Circuit, but in 2004,
the Supreme Court answered the question of the
reach of the Alien Tort Statute for the entire coun-
try. The case involved Humberto Alvarez-Machain,
a Mexican physician.10
Officials of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) believed that when one of their agents,
Enrique Camarena-Salazar, was captured in 1985
in Mexico, tortured over a two-day period, and then
murdered, Alvarez-Machain had been present and
had used his medical skills to extend the interroga-
tion and the torture. Demonstrating how strongly
the U.S. government objected to physicians partic-
ipating in torture, the DEA in 1990 took the extraor-
dinary step of hiring Mexican nationals to kidnap
Alvarez-Machain and bring him to the United States
for trial. The kidnapping succeeded, but at trial
Alvarez-Machain was found not guilty. After return-
ing to Mexico, Alvarez-Machain brought an action
against the United States under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute, alleging false arrest and arbitrary detention.
Alvarez-Machain won at trial, and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
In an opinion written by Justice David Souter,
the Supreme Court reversed the award. Nonethe-
less, this opinion determined the meaning and
reach of the Alien Tort Statute, enacted by Con-
gress in 1789, which states in its entirety: “The dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” The question before the Court was
whether, as the Ninth Circuit had ruled, this statute
gave U.S. district courts the legal authority to hear a
case like that brought by Alvarez-Machain in which
the plaintiff alleges a “violation of the law of na-
tions.”
The Court was unable to find any evidence that
Congress in 1789 had specific violations of inter-
national law in mind but supposed that the most
likely ones were Blackstone’s “three primary of-
fenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” The Court
then cited Filartiga as the beginning of “the modern
line of cases.” The Court concluded that federal
courts can determine just what the current “law of
nations” is but instructed courts to be conservative
in determining what international law requires: “We
think courts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of in-
ternational character accepted by the civilized world
and defined with a specificity comparable to the
feature of the 18th-century paradigms we have rec-
ognized [e.g., piracy].”10
In support of his position that his arbitrary de-
tention was a violation of international law, Alvarez-
Machain cited the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The Court found that the Universal
Declaration did not have the force of law and that
“the United States ratified the Covenant on the ex-
press understanding that it was not self-executing
and so did not itself create obligations enforceable
in the federal courts.”10 Treaties and custom are the
primary sources of international law. After treaties
had been rejected as support for Alvarez-Machain,
he was left to argue that arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion, like piracy, had attained the status of “binding
customary international law.” Given its reluctance
to recognize new causes of action, it is not surpris-
ing that the Court rejected Alvarez-Machain’s argu-
ment on the grounds that it “would support a cause
of action in federal court for any arrest, anywhere
in the world, unauthorized by the law of the juris-
diction in which it took place.”10 The case thus
stands for the proposition that a brief illegal deten-
tion is insufficient grounds for a claim in U.S.
courts as a violation of international law.
The decision is more important for its state-
ment that when acts are universally condemned by
international law, such as state-sanctioned piracy,
the rights of torture victims
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torture, and murder, they can be the basis for a law-
suit under the Alien Tort Statute. The decision reaf-
firms the long-standing view of the Supreme Court
that “the domestic law of the United States recog-
nizes the law of nations.”10,18 In a case alleging
torture, the Court would find torture a violation of
international law both because it is universally con-
demned in international law and because the Con-
gress has ratified the Convention against Torture
and adopted a law authorizing individual lawsuits
to be brought by victims of torture. Thus, under the
Alien Tort Statute, the victims of torture at the pris-
ons at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, for exam-
ple, may bring a claim against their alleged tortur-
ers in U.S. courts — and it should be expected that
many will.
The road to torture at Abu Ghraib begins arguably
with the president’s decision in February 2002 that
the Geneva Conventions would not apply to “ene-
my combatants” jailed at Guantanamo Bay.19 This
decision was made over the strong objections of
then Secretary of State Colin Powell and without any
meaningful input from the career lawyers in the
armed services, all of whom objected to jettisoning
the Geneva Conventions, an international treaty
from which the United States had never before de-
viated. The reasons given for taking prisoners to
Guantanamo was that the global war on terror was
a “new kind of war” that made the Geneva Conven-
tions inapplicable and that Guantanamo could and
should be used as an interrogation center for sus-
pected terrorists that was outside the jurisdiction
and, thus, the oversight of U.S. courts.20,21
It seems to have been assumed that if neither
the Constitution nor international law applied in
Guantanamo Bay, the administration could write
its own rules of conduct for the prison, and it did.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for exam-
ple, specifically approved types of torture that could
be used in interrogations there, and he specifically
involved physicians in it by requiring that prisoners
have “medical clearance” before these techniques
were applied to them.22 In the words of Rumsfeld’s
directive, the new techniques can be used only af-
ter, among other things, “the detainee is medically
and operationally evaluated as suitable (consider-
ing all techniques to be used in combination).”22
These torture techniques made their way to Abu
Ghraib when the commander of the prison at Guan-
tanamo Bay, General Geoffrey Miller, was trans-
ferred to Iraq in 2004.23
According to the administration, the Geneva
Conventions were to apply in Iraq. Had they been
followed, the torture and abuse of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib would not have occurred. The conventions
not only prohibit torture and abusive and humiliat-
ing treatment of prisoners but also specifically pro-
tect physicians who follow medical ethics by re-
porting and refusing to participate in torture and
abuse of prisoners.24 The Independent Panel to Re-
view Department of Defense Detention Operations
highlighted professional ethics as the core consid-
eration in the prevention of torture and abuse, stat-
ing that “all personnel who may be engaged in de-
tention operations, from point of capture to final
disposition, should participate in a professional
ethics program that would equip them with a sharp
moral compass for guidance in situations often riv-
en with conflicting moral obligations.”25 With re-
gard specifically to physicians, “the Panel notes that
the Fay investigation [by the Army] cited some med-
ical personnel for failure to report detainee abuse.
As noted in that investigation, training should in-
clude the obligation to report any detainee abuse.”20
On June 28, 2004, the day before the Supreme
Court decided the Alien Tort Statute case, the Court
decided that under the statute, prisoners at Guan-
tanamo could challenge their imprisonment in U.S.
courts as well as bring civil claims for injury and
abuse.26 The Court thus rejected the position of the
Bush administration, as stated in oral argument
before the Ninth Circuit, that even were the United
States engaged in “murder and torture” at Guan-
tanamo, U.S. courts could not interfere. In another
case that was decided on the same day, the Supreme
Court ruled that a U.S. citizen who was captured on
the battlefield in Afghanistan and initially held at
Guantanamo before being transferred to the Unit-
ed States had the right to a fair hearing under the
Constitution to contest his status as an “enemy
combatant.”27 In this opinion, the Court cited pro-
visions of Geneva Convention III (concerning pris-
oners of war) as authoritative on the “law of war.”27
More recently, a district court has ruled explicitly
that the Geneva Conventions must be followed at
Guantanamo.28 In all these cases, the judicial branch
of government has been much more articulate than
the executive branch in condemning torture and
upholding both U.S. and international law.
the geneva conventions
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As Telford Taylor argued at the Nuremberg Trials,
the prevention of crimes against humanity, includ-
ing torture, must be our primary goal. Torture re-
mains widely practiced around the world, even
though universally condemned. Amnesty Interna-
tional estimates that 150 countries currently prac-
tice torture. Torture is wrong under all circumstanc-
es, because it is cruel and degrading to humans and
an extreme violation of human rights under in-
ternational law. Jean-Paul Sartre’s description of
torture, written almost 50 years ago during the
French–Algerian War, should resonate in the United
States after the attacks on September 11: “Torture
is senseless violence, born in fear.”29 Now that the
president has proclaimed that torture is always
wrong, we must return to the question of how to
prevent it effectively during wartime when a high-
level or low-level official believes that torture, al-
though illegal, appears nonetheless to be likely to
aid the war effort.
Preventing torture is everyone’s business — but
three professions seem to be especially well suited
to prevent torture: medicine, law, and the military.
Each profession has particular obligations. Physi-
cians have the obligations of the universally recog-
nized and respected role of healers. Lawyers have the
obligations to respect and uphold the law, including
international humanitarian law. And military offi-
cers have the obligation to follow the international
laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions.
Americans need the blessings of both lawyers
and physicians to justify torture. Professor of law
Alan Dershowitz, for example, believes that we must
accept that torture will be used in extreme situations
and try to regularize its practice by requiring prior
judicial approval of its use and limiting it to the in-
fliction of “nonlethal pain” — such as “shoving
a sterilized needle under the fingernail of a sus-
pect.”30,31 Both Dershowitz and the Fox television
network’s hit program 24 glamorize torture by
portraying ticking-time-bomb scenarios in which
a captured terrorist knows where a bomb will soon
explode that will kill many innocent civilians.30 Of
course, medicalizing torture does not make it right
or effective — even in such a situation. Internation-
al terrorists have already gone beyond such scenar-
ios by combining the bomb and the terrorist into
a single entity, the suicide bomber.
The challenges of the war on terror present an
opportunity for medical and legal professional or-
ganizations to work together transnationally to up-
hold medical ethics and international humanitarian
law, respectively, rather than to search for ways to
avoid legal or ethical dictates. In addition, the war
on terror provides physicians and lawyers who are
also military officers with an opportunity to clarify
their roles in the military services and their obliga-
tions under international law and the U.S. Uniform
Code of Military Justice.
Almost 30 years ago, Sagan and Jonsen observed
in the Journal that because the medical skills used
for healing can be maliciously perverted “with dev-
astating effects on the spirit and the body,” it is “in-
cumbent upon the medical profession and upon all
of its practitioners to protest in effective ways
against torture as an instrument of political con-
trol.”32 Such protest can help in the war against
terrorism. Neither the use of torture nor violations
of human rights, as another professor of law, the
Jesuit Robert Drinan, has observed, will “induce
other nations to follow the less traveled road that
leads to democracy and equality,” but the “mobili-
zation of shame” and the “moral power” of exam-
ple can do so.33 Torture begins by dehumanizing
the victim but ends by dehumanizing the torturer.
As Telford Taylor put it at Nuremberg, “A nation
that deliberately infects itself with poison will inev-
itably sicken and die.”1
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston.
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